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Abstract  
In this paper optimal income taxation theories are subject of investigation following the classic paper 
in public finance by Mirrlees (1971), than the models of Sadka (1976), Seade,(1977), Akerlof 
(1978),Stiglitz (1982), Diamond (1998), and Saez (2001) , Piketty-Saez-Stantcheva (2014), all related to 
the classic paper by Mirrlees (1971). The problem is to maximize integral over population of the social 
evaluation of individual utility, that depends on individual consumption and labor.  This paper first 
posed the problem of asymmetric information since the basic idea of the paper is that a first-best 
redistribution scheme is based on innate ability, and the information about ability is known to the 
individual, the government observes instead earnings. Mirrlees (1971), provides analytical solutions 
for the second-best efficient tax system in presence of such an adverse selection. Untill late 1990s, 
Mirrlees results not closely connected to empirical tax studies and little impact on tax policy 
recommendations Since late 1990s, Diamond (1998), Saez (2001) have connected Mirrlees model to 
practical tax policy / empirical tax studies. Mankiw, Weinzierl, and Yagan (2009) provide MATLAB code 
for analyzing the Mirrlees model MTR and wages, they are using log-normal and Pareto distributions. 
Later we look up to theory for optimal commodity sales taxes Ramsey (1927),using Ramsey rule 
utilized in Feldstein (1978) also , Diamond-Mirrlees (1971a), Diamond-Mirrlees (1971b) propose 
alternative to Ramsey proposition.  
Key words: Optimal taxes, public finance, optimal minimum wage, asymmetric information 
Introduction  
 
Mirrlees (1986), elaborates that a good way of governing is to agree upon objectives, than to 
discover what is possible and to optimize. The central element of the theory of optimal taxation is 
information. Public policies apply to the individuals on the basis of what the government knows 
about them. Second welfare theorem states, that where a number of convexity and continuity 
assumptions are satisfied, an optimum is a competitive equilibrium once initial endowments have 
been suitably distributed. In general, complete information about the consumers for the transfers is 
required to make the distribution requires, so the question of feasible lump-sum transfers arises 
here. Usually the optimal tax systems combine flat marginal tax rate plus lump sum grants to all the 
individuals(so that the average tax rate rises with income even if the marginal does not), Mankiw 
NG, Weinzierl M, Yagan D.(2009)1. The choice of the optimal redistributive tax involves tradeoffs 
between three kinds of effects : equity effect (it changes the distribution of income) , the efficiency 
effect form reducing the incentives, the insurance effect from reducing the variance of individual 
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income streams, Varian,H.R.(1980).In his model Varian (1980) derives optimal linear and nonlinear 
tax schedule. He uses Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function(VNM decision utility, or decision 
preferences) 2 , with declining absolute risk aversion, see Kreps (1988).  Varian (1980), concentrates 
especially on the problem of social insurance that previously was treated by Diamond, Mirrlees 
(1978) ,where in their model were emphasized the insurance-incentive aspects involved the 
retirement decision .Diamond, Helms and Mirrlees (1978),analyze the presence of uncertainty in the 
analysis of optimal taxation, with Cobb-Douglas utility function, with elasticity of substitution 
between labor and leisure <1 s that backward bending labor supply curve can be observed. Two 
period model with uncertainty showed how stochastic economies differ from the economies without 
uncertainty, since these second best insurance/redistribution programs differ in the outcomes from 
the first best resut economies without government intervention. In general if income contains 
random component then a system of redistributive taxation would contribute in the reduction of the 
variance in the after-tax income. In general Varian (1980) finds for linear and non-linear optimal tax, 
that if the consumption values are bounded, the optimal tax will always exist and would be a 
continuous function of observed income. Also in this model marginal tax are positive and the 
optimal tax will be increasing in contrast to the findings of Mirrlees (1971).  In early contribution 
Ramsey (1927) , supposed that the planner must raise tax revenue only through imposition of tax on 
commodities only. In his model taxes should be imposed in inverse proportion to the representative 
customer’s elasticity of demand for the good, so that commodities with more inelastic demand are 
taxed more heavily. But form the standpoint of public economics, goal is to derive the best tax 
system. In perfect economy with absent of any market imperfection (externality), if the economy is 
described by the representative agent, that consumer is going to pay the entire bill of the 
government, so that the lump-sum tax is the optimal tax. Governments in real world however 
cannot observe individual ability.  Mirrlees (1971) , in the basic version of the model allowed 
individuals to differ in their innate ability. The planer can observe income, but the planner cannot 
observe ability or effort.  By recognizing unobserved heterogeneity, diminishing marginal utility of 
consumption, and incentive effects, the Mirrlees approach formalizes the classical tradeoff between 
efficiency and equity. In this framework the optimal tax problem is a problem of imperfect 
information between taxpayers and the social planner. Saez (2001) argued that “unbounded 
distributions are of much more interest than bounded distributions to address high income optimal 
tax rate problem”. In all of the cases that Saez (2001) investigated (four cases)3 the optimal tax rates 
are clearly U-shaped. This paper by using the elasticity estimates from the literature, the formula for 
the asymptotic top rates suggests that the marginal rates for the labor income should not be lower 
than 50% and they could be as much as high as 80%.This paper used methodology proposed by 
Diamond (1998).  Diamond and Mirrlees (1971a) and Diamond, Mirrlees (1971b) , are proposing 
alternative in Ramsey proposition by allowing the social planer to considers a numerous tax systems. 
In the first paper Diamond and Mirrlees (1971a), they prove how some market imperfections  eg. 
capital market imperfections (consumers can lend but not borrow), the market situation will alter 
the optimal tax structure. Diamond and Mirrlees (1971b), are proposing tax rules for single good 
economy (changes on demand due to the tax structure differ from proportionality with larger than 
average percentage fall in the demand for goods with large income derivatives (elasticities)) ,in 
three-good economy the tax rate is proportionately greater  for a good with smaller cross elasticity 
of compensated demand with the price of labor, in many commodities economy , households with 
low social marginal income utility predominate among the purchasers of the commodity, that 
                                                             
2 This theorem serves as a basis of the expected utility theory. This theory actually represents maximizing the 
expected value of some function defined over the potential outcomes at some specified point in the future 
3 Utilitarian criterion, utility type I and II and Rawlsian criterion, utility type I and II.  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3390397 
3 
 
commodity should be taxed more heavily, and vice versa, this taxation increases total welfare. It also 
shows that at optimum , the social marginal weighted utility changes in taxation are proportional to 
the changes in total tax revenue (income and commodity tax revenue), calculated at fixed prices, 
with consumer behavior corresponding to the price change. This study thus is not suggesting that 
commodity taxation is superior to income taxation.  Also, this paper proves that the presence of 
commodity taxes implies the desirability of aggregate production efficiency even if the production is 
not Pareto optimal i.e. results is second best. In the second best setting however aggregate 
production efficiency over the whole economy may not be desirable, because distortionary taxes on 
transactions of individuals and firms will be needed to redistribute the real income or finance the 
production of public goods so that second best optimum will be reached (Second fundamental 
welfare theorem), Hammond (2000). Diamond and Mirrlees (1971a), continue to point out that 
there should not be taxation on intermediate goods such as capital held by the producers, also see 
Judd (1999).The general result Judd (1999) finds is that optimal tax on capital should be zero except 
for the initial period. Judd (1985), also found a zero optimal long-run capital income tax rate for 
steady states of the general competitive equilibrium and heterogeneous infinitely-lived agents with 
nonseparable preferences.  But the famous Atkinson,Stiglitz (1976) results(result on the role of 
indirect taxation with an optimal nonlinear income tax) states that commodity taxes are not useful 
under these assumptions about the utility function: weak separability of function, and homogeneity 
across individuals in sub-utility of consumption. Proof of this theorem can be found in Laroque, 
G.(2005) , and Kaplow, L.(2006).The Atkinson-Stiglitz result is obtained by embedding the Ramsey 
model within Mirrlees model.Also zero-top tax  rate suggest important task for the policy makers to 
identify the shape of the high-end of the ability distribution (they cannot observe the effort and 
ability in direct way but they can observe income).  Tuomala (1990), confirms that marginal tax rate 
decreases as income increases except at income levels within a bottom decile. Ordover, J.,  Phelps,E. 
(1979), provided that if consumption have weakly separable utility functions and government has 
instruments that allow it to fix the capital stock on the socially optimal level, then the optimal tax 
rate on capital is zero, Salanie (2003). Chamley (1986), results on zero capital income tax states: “ 
When the consumption decisions in a given period have only a negligible effect on the structure of 
preferences for  periods in the distant future, then the second-best tax rate on capital income tends 
to zero in the long run”. But these are (Ramsey capital income tax )two period models if more 
periods are included than the optimal tax formula would be more complex, as in Auerbach, Kotlikoff 
(1987a), and Auerbach, Kotlikoff (1987b). But what about estate and gift taxes and property taxes? 
Modigliani,F.,Brumberg ,R.H. (1954), Modigliani, F. (1966),Modigliani(1976) , Modigliani, F. (1986), 
Modigliani(1988) , view states that life cycle wealth accounts for the bulk of wealth (in US). Kotlikoff 
and Summers (1981) challenged this old view4. Here key problem is that the definition of life-cycle 
vs. inherited wealth is not conceptually clean. Previous Kotlikoff-Summers controversy consisted in 
the fact that estimates of the share of inherited wealth in aggregate wealth for Modgiliani (1986), 
Modigliani (1988) definition was 20% as low, and for Kotlikoff and Summers (1981)  was as 80% high 
(data were the same). Piketty, Т., Postel-Vinay,G.,Rosenthal,J.L,(2014), give better definition that the 
individual wealth is a sum of individual earnings minus expenditures (accrued amount ) multiplied by  
compound interest rate. Feldstein (1978), showed that elimination of tax on capital income is only 
optimal only  when the structure of preferences satisfy certain separability condition. And for the 
capital taxation to be optimal it must be that uncompensated elasticity of savings (elasticity of the 
Marshalian demand for savings) is zero, even when the compensated elasticity of consumption of 
old population (Hicksian demand for consumption) is high (he reported result of -0.75). Now, if the 
                                                             
4 Why is this important? ...taxation of capital income and estates, Role of pay-as-you-go vs. funded retirement 
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labor and consumption are equivalent for the individuals, but savings pattern are different, results is 
that individuals will save more with consumption tax, than with labor tax. In OLG closed economy 
capital stock is due to life-time savings. The full neutrality result implies extra savings of young is 
equal to the consumption of old capital stock plus new government deficit (no change in capital 
stock)5.In equilibrium where endowment is zero at equilibrium, and Hicksian demand for 
consumption is infinite i.e. compensated elasticity of consumption when old is infinite. But according 
to Saez,Stantcheva (2016a), because individuals derive utility from wealth, micro foundations for this 
wealth in the utility function are : bequest motives, entrepreneurship, or services from wealth it 
means that steady-state features finite finite supply elasticities of capital to capital tax rates. And 
because there is bi-heterogeneity of the agent’s income and capital, Atkinson-Stiglitz zero-tax result 
does not apply herein. The optimal tax rate on inheritance (bequest in utility) case is zero, when the 
elasticity of bequest is infinite nesting the zero tax result. However, when in the model are imputed 
bequests, inequality is bi-dimensional and earnings are no longer the unique determinant of lifetime 
resources. That means that here A-S zero-tax result fails, see Piketty, T. , Saez,E., (2013), Farhi and 
Werning (2010).Also, Stiglitz, J.(1982) , showed that when leisure and goods are separable, 
differential taxation of commodities cannot be used as a basis of separation between the two and 
therefore is sub-optimal, Saez (2002).  Commodity taxation is desirable when government is using 
social weights that are correlated with the consumption patterns and are conditional on income, or 
when the consumption patterns are related to the intrinsic earning ability and leisure choices6. Saez, 
E. ,S. Stantcheva (2016b),define social marginal welfare weight as a function of agents  consumption, 
earnings, and a set of characteristics that affect social marginal welfare weight and a set of 
characteristics that affect utility. Chari and Kehoe(1999), besides developing stronger zero-optimal 
capital income tax rate than Chamley (1986), are developing Barro’s (1979) result on tax smoothing, 
where in deterministic concept, optimal tax rates are constant, while in stochastic economy with 
incomplete markets tax rates follow a random pattern generated by a martingale process7 .And the 
tax smoothing hypothesis requires tax rate to be changed (altered) only when some unpredicted 
shock occurs. This means that there should be no predictable changes in tax rates in times without 
shocks. The optimal capital tax formula is a function of social marginal welfare weights, that are 
product of Pareto weight and the utility of consumption of individuals, and this weights are 
normalized across the population to one. Optimal linear income and linear capital tax are inversely 
related to the elasticity, the revenue maximizing tax rates are calculated when weights on capital 
and labor are zero. The non-linear capital and labor taxes are dependent on the average welfare 
weight of capital income higher than the product of rate of return of capital and capital stock itself, 
and average welfare weight higher than the individual earnings. Pareto weights here proportional to 
net rate of return of capital and density of taxed labor income, and probability density function of 
tax system which is linearized at points of net tax return (substitution effects, no income effects) and 
earnings. Auerbach, A. (2009), Kaplow(1994), propose equivalence of consumption taxes and labor 
taxes: a linear consumption at some inclusive rate, is equivalent to a labor tax income combined 
with the initial wealth.  In this setting consumption tax is equal to labor tax if there is no initial 
wealth and differences in wealth arise only from wealth preferences.  
                                                             
5 Aggregate interest rate should equal to interest rate for the government debt.  
6 And if in the presence of optimal income taxation whether if a small commodity tax can be replicated by a 
small income change, and when this is not a case commodity taxation allows government to expand its own 
taxation power and therefore it is desirable.  
7  Martingale is a sequence of random variables (i.e., a stochastic process) for which, at a particular time, the 
conditional expectation of the next value in the sequence, given all prior values, is equal to the present value. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3390397 
5 
 
Optimal taxation models: Mirrless (1971)  
In the Mirrlees (1971) model, all individuals have same utility function which depends positively on 
consumption, and negatively on labor supply  ,which can be denoted as 𝑢(𝑐, 𝑙).Let’s suppose the 
utility function g the agents in the economy  Mirrlees (1971) model: 
Equation 1 
𝑈(𝑐, 𝑙) = 𝑐 −
𝑙2
2
 
Where  𝑦 = 𝜃𝑙 и 𝜃 represents the level of skils of the worker. Now his social welfare function SWF is  
:𝑆𝑊𝐹(𝑣) = log(𝑣).Now lets find the distribution of skills when  𝑇(𝑦) = 0.3 which is Pareto with 
ℎ(𝑦) = 𝑘𝑦−𝑘−1𝑦𝑘8.Equation for the distribution of skills is 𝑓(𝜃) = ℎ(𝑦(𝜃))𝑦′(𝜃),from the quasi-
linear utility functions : 𝑈(𝑐, 𝑦, 𝜃) = 𝑐 −
1
2
(
𝑦
𝜃
)
2
.And the tax function 𝑇(𝑦) = 𝜏𝑦, individual with skill 
level 𝜃 solves : 
Equation 2 
max
𝑦
(1 − 𝜏)𝑦 −
1
2
(
𝑦
𝜃
)
2
 
FOC is given as :(1 − 𝜏) −
𝑦
𝜃2
= 0, which implies that 𝑦 = (1 − 𝜏)𝜃2 and 𝑓(𝜃) = ℎ(𝑦(𝜃))𝑦′(𝜃) =
𝑘(𝜃)−𝑘−1𝑦𝑘2(1 − 𝜏)𝜃 = 𝑘((1 − 𝜏)𝜃2)
−𝑘−1
𝑦𝑘2(1 − 𝜏)𝜃 = 2𝑘(1 − 𝜏)−𝑘𝜃−2𝑘−1𝑦𝑘 =
2𝑘𝜃−2𝑘−1𝜃𝑙
2𝑘  .By integration one could get  :𝐹(𝜃) = ∫ 𝑓(𝜃)𝑑𝜃 = ∫ 2𝑘(1 − 𝜏)−𝑘𝜃−2𝑘−1𝑦𝑘𝑑𝜃 =
𝜃
𝜃𝑙
𝜃
𝜃𝑙
[−(1 − 𝜏)−𝑘𝜃−2𝑘𝑦𝑘]
𝜃𝑙
𝜃
= (1 − 𝜏)−𝑘𝜃𝑙
−2𝑘−1 ((1 − 𝜏)𝜃𝑙
2)
𝑘
− (1 − 𝜏)−𝑘𝜃−2𝑘𝑦𝑘 = 1 − 𝜃−2𝑘𝜃𝑙
2𝑘.Now 
we can solve for numerical optimum. Let’s use  𝑦 = 2 and 𝑘 = 4  and truncate the distrubition9 at 
the top 𝑥 percentile for some small 𝑥.    
 In this case : max
𝑣(𝜃),𝑢(𝜃)
∫ 𝑊[𝑣(𝜃)]𝑓(𝜃)𝑑𝜃
𝜃ℎ
𝜃𝑙
.Subject to : 
∫ (𝑦(𝜃) − 𝑒(𝑣(𝜃), 𝑦(𝜃), 𝜃))𝑓(𝜃)𝑑𝜃 ≥ 0; 𝑣′(𝜃) = 𝑢𝜃  [𝑒(𝑣(𝜃), 𝑦(𝜃), 𝜃)]
𝜃ℎ
𝜃𝑙
 
𝑦(𝜃) is non decreasing function. Hamiltonian is formed as  :𝐻 = 𝑊 [𝑣(𝜃)]𝑓(𝜃) + 𝜆 (𝑦(𝜃) −
 𝑒(𝑣(𝜃), 𝑦(𝜃), 𝜃))𝑓(𝜃) + 𝜂 (𝜃)𝑈𝜃  [𝑒(𝑣(𝜃), 𝑦(𝜃), 𝜃), 𝑦(𝜃), 𝜃]. 
Standard conditions are as: 
1. 
𝜕𝐻
𝜕𝑦
= 0 ⇒ 𝜆𝑓(1 − 𝑒𝑦) + 𝜂[𝑢𝜃𝑐𝑒𝑦 + 𝑢𝜃𝑦] = 0 
2. 
𝜕𝐻
𝜕𝑣
== 𝜂′ ⇒ 𝑊′𝑓 − 𝜆𝑒𝑣𝑓 + 𝜂𝑢𝜃𝑐𝑒𝑣 = −𝜂
′ 
Transfersality conditions : 𝜂(𝜃𝑙) = 𝜂(𝜃
ℎ) = 0 .From  𝑊 = log(𝑣) и  𝑢(𝑐, 𝑦, 𝜃) = 𝑐 − (
1
2
) (
𝑦
𝜃
)
2
 
will get the following derivatives :𝑢𝜃 =
𝑦2
𝜃3
; 𝑢𝜃𝑐 = 0;  𝑢𝜃𝑦 =
2𝑦
3
 ;  𝑊′ =
1
𝑣
.Let us remember that 
                                                             
8 This is a density of earnings function , dependent on the skills of workers  
9 In statistics  truncated distribution is a conditional distribution that comes as a result of the restriction 
of the domain of some other distribution or probability .  
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𝑣 = 𝑢(𝑒(𝑣, 𝑦, 𝜃), 𝑦, 𝜃),we have 1 = 𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑣 и 0 = 𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑦 + 𝑢𝑦,therefore :𝑒𝑣 =
1
𝑢𝑐
; 𝑒𝑦 = −
𝑢𝑦
𝑢𝑐
=
𝑦
𝜃2
. If 
we substitute in the optimality and control equations about the state variables one can get : 
Equation 3 
𝜆𝑓 (1 −
𝑦
𝜃2
) + 𝜂 [
2𝑦
𝜃3
] = 0 и 
𝑓
𝑣
− 𝜆𝑓 = −𝜂′ 
If we solve in the first equation for 𝑦(𝜃) we get : 𝑦(𝜃) =
𝜆𝑓 (𝜃)𝜃3
𝜆𝑓 (𝜃)𝜃−2𝜂(𝜃)
. With the equation 
𝜂′𝜂′(𝜃) = (𝜆 −
1
𝑣(𝜃)
) 𝑓(𝜃). If we substitute for 𝑦(𝜃) in the constraint :𝑣′(𝜃) =
𝑢𝜃[𝑒(𝑣(𝜃), 𝑦(𝜃), 𝜃), 𝑦, 𝜃] =
𝑦2
𝜃3
= (
𝜆𝑓 (𝜃)
𝜆𝑓 (𝜃)𝜃−2𝜂(𝜃) 
)
2
𝜃3.In Saez (2001) optimal tax formula is given as : 
Equation 4 
𝜏 =
1 − ?̅?
1 − ?̅? + 𝜀?̅? + 𝜀̅𝑐(𝑎 − 1) 
  
In the previous expression 𝜏 are taxes, ?̅? is the ratio of social marginal utility for the top bracket 
taxpayers to the marginal value of public funds for the government, which depends on the social 
welfare function 10. Utility in the social welfare function provides a guideline for the 
government for achieving optimal distribution of income, Tresch, R. W. (2008) . In the Saez 
(2001) optimal tax formula also :  𝜀̅𝑢 = ∫ 𝜀𝑤
𝑢𝑤ℎ(𝑤)𝑑𝑤/𝑤𝑚
∞
?̅?
 , where Marshallian demand for 
labor is given as :𝑤 = 𝑤(1 − 𝜏, 𝑅) where 𝑅 is the non-labour income, and 𝑤  are earnings(wages)11. 
And compensated elasticity of earnings is : 𝜀̅𝑐 =
1−𝜏
𝑤
(
𝜕𝑤
𝜕(1−𝜏)
) |
𝑢
 .Thоse two are related by the Slutsky 
equation : 𝜀𝑐 = 𝜀𝑢 − 𝜂, when there are no behavioral responses there is only meachnical effect 
denote by M and 𝑀 = [𝑤𝑚 −  ?̅? ]𝑑𝜏 , where 𝑤𝑚 −  ?̅? represents the earnings of the agent above 
medium population earnings. Behavioral responses are equal to : 𝑑𝑤 = −
𝜕𝑤
𝜕(1−𝜏)
𝑑𝜏 +
𝜕𝑤
𝜕𝑅
𝑑𝑅 =
−(𝜀𝑢𝑤 −
(1−𝜏)𝜕𝑤
𝜕𝑅
)(
𝑑𝜏
1−𝜏
) ,or the total behavioral response 𝛽 = −(𝜀𝑢𝑤
(1−𝜏)𝜕𝑤
𝜕𝑅
)(
𝜏𝑑𝜏
1−𝜏
).Saez(2001) 
result for high income earners is given as : 
𝜏
1−𝜏
=
(1−?̅?) (𝑤𝑚/(?̅?−1)
?̅?𝑢𝑤𝑚
?̅?−∫ 𝜂𝑤ℎ(𝑤)𝑑𝑤 
∞
?̅?
.In the Mirrlees(1971)  model 
government , maximizes12 :𝑆𝑊𝐹 = ∫ 𝐺(𝑢𝑤)𝑓(𝑤)𝑑𝑤
∞
0
. In the previous expression 𝐺(𝑢𝑤) represents 
the concave utility function13.The constraint here is given as: ∫ 𝐺(𝑢𝑤)𝑓(𝑤)𝑑𝑤 ≦
∞
0
∫ 𝑤𝑙𝑓(𝑤)𝑑𝑤 − 𝐸 
∞
0
 ,where 𝐸 are government expenditures. Now, about Pareto distributions it is 
well known fact that :
𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒
𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑
= 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 .Now if we denote the average wage  𝑤∗(𝑤) > 𝑤, 
and if 𝑤 is a threshold, then 𝑤∗(𝑤) can be expressed as :𝑤∗(𝑤) = ∫ 𝑤𝑓(𝑤)𝑑𝑤/𝑤𝑚>𝑤
                                                             
10 Social welfare function can be :𝑆𝑊𝐹 = ∫𝑈𝑖 𝑑𝑖-Utilitarian or Benthamite, 𝑆𝑊𝐹 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑈
𝑖- 
Rawlsian 𝑆𝑊𝐹 = ∫𝑈𝑖𝑑𝑖 → 𝐺(𝑈) =
𝑈1−𝛾
1−𝛾
 if 𝛾 = 0  function is utilitarian  , Rawlsian if 𝛾 = ∞. With Pareto 
weights: 𝑆𝑊𝐹 = ∫𝜇𝑖𝑈
𝑖 𝑑𝑖 where  𝜇𝑖 is exogenous.   
11 Income effects are captured through 𝜂 = (1 − 𝜏)𝜕𝑤/𝜕𝑅  ,average income effects are :?̅? = ∫ 𝜂𝑤ℎ(𝑤)𝑑𝑤 
∞
?̅?
 
12 Here we make assumption that wages =skill level  
13 Now, for a concave function 𝑓: (𝑎, 𝑏) → 𝑅 is continuous in 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐴. This function 𝑓: (𝑎, 𝑏) → 𝑅 is concave in 
the interval (𝑎, 𝑏) , if for every 𝑥1, 𝑥2 ∈ (𝑎, 𝑏), 𝑎 ∈ (0,1), it follows 𝑓(𝑎𝑥1 + (1 − 𝑎)𝑥2) < 𝑎𝑓(𝑥1) +
(1 − 𝑎)𝑓(𝑥2). 
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 ∫ 𝑓(𝑤)𝑑𝑤 = ∫ 𝑑𝑤/𝑤𝑎𝑤𝑚>𝑤
/ ∫ 𝑑𝑤/𝑤1+𝑎 =
𝑎𝑤
𝑎−1𝑤𝑚>𝑤𝑤𝑚>𝑤 
 .In the previous expression 𝑎 
represents the shape parameter of the Pareto distribution. And 𝑎 =
𝑏
𝑏−1
 i.e. 
𝑤∗(𝑤)
𝑤
= 𝑏 .About the 
Pareto distribution PDF of this distribution is given as :1 − 𝐹(𝑤) = (
𝑘
𝑤
)
𝑎
 ,and CDF of the function is 
given as 𝑓(𝑤) =
𝑎𝑘𝑎
𝑤1+𝑎
,14that is lim
𝑤→∞
(
𝑘
𝑤
)
𝑎
𝑤∙(
𝑎𝑘𝑎
𝑤1+𝑎
)
 by applying lim
𝑥→𝑎
[𝑐 ∙ 𝑓(𝑥)] = 𝑐 ∙ lim
𝑥→𝑎
𝑓(𝑥) ⇒
1
𝑎𝑘𝑎
∙ lim
𝑤→∞
(
𝑘
𝑤
)
𝑎
𝑤∙(
𝑎𝑘𝑎
𝑤1+𝑎
)
=
1
𝑎𝑘𝑎
∙ lim
𝑤→∞
(𝑘𝑎) =
1
𝑎𝑘𝑎
∙ 𝑘𝑎 =
1
𝑎
 .hence the formula of marginal income for top 
earners 𝜏∗ =
1
1+𝑎∙𝜀
.This is the tax rate that maximizes government revenues. Now, 
1−𝐹(𝑤)
𝑤𝑓
 represents 
the ratio of people with wages above 𝑤  ,which is the mass of people paying more tax, and on the 
right the people affected by the adverse incentive effects. The social optimum means U shaped 
pattern of marginal tax rates. Diamond (1998) , gives such an example in his ABC tax model. There 
salaries are distributed 𝑤(𝑤𝑙 , 𝑤ℎ).The government objective function than becomes 
:∫ 𝑢(𝑤)𝜓(𝑤)𝑑𝑤 
𝑤ℎ
𝑤𝑙
, in the previous expression 𝜓(𝑤) represents the distribution function. Now if 
∫ 𝑢(𝑤)𝜓(𝑤)𝑑𝑤 
𝑤ℎ
𝑤𝑙
= 1 , it means that 𝜆 = 1  15 , or 𝜆 = ∫ 𝐺′(𝑢(𝑤))𝑓(𝑤)𝑑𝑤 = 1 
𝑤ℎ
𝑤𝑙
,and 
𝜇(𝑤)denotes the multiplier on the incentive constraint of type w, and is equal to −𝜇(𝑤) =
∫ (𝑓(𝑤) − 𝜓(𝑤))
𝑤ℎ
𝑤𝑙
𝑑𝑤 = Ψ(w) − F(w),here Ψ(w) is a CDF of the function,and F(w) is a 
distribution of skills. The optimal tax government formula with Rawlsian government 16would be : 
Equation 5 
𝑇′(𝑤(ℎ))
1−𝑇′(𝑤(ℎ))
= (
1+𝜀
𝜀
)
1−𝐹(𝑤)
𝑤𝑓(𝑤)
   or 
𝑇′(𝑤(ℎ))
1−𝑇′(𝑤(ℎ))
= (
1+𝜀
𝜀
)
𝜓(𝑤)−𝐹(𝑤)
𝑤𝑓(𝑤)
 
Now if we divide and multiply by 1 − 𝐹(𝑤) we get :
𝑇′(𝑤(ℎ))
1−𝑇′(𝑤(ℎ))
= (
1+𝜀
𝜀
)
Ψ(𝑤)−𝐹(𝑤)
1−𝐹(𝑤)
1−𝐹(𝑤)
𝑤𝑓(𝑤)
 .In the 
previous formula (
1+𝜀
𝜀
) = 𝐴(𝑤) , elasticity and efficiency argument, 
Ψ(𝑤)−𝐹(𝑤)
1−𝐹(𝑤)
= 𝐵(𝑤), measures 
the desire for redistribution :if the sum of weights 𝜓(𝑤)𝑓(𝑤) is below 𝑤 is relative high to the 
weights above , the government will like to tax more, this part 
1−𝐹(𝑤)
𝑤𝑓(𝑤)
= 𝐶(𝑤) measures the density 
of the right tail of the distribution and higher density will be associated with higher taxes. In Piketty, 
T., Saez.E., and Stantcheva,S.(2014), it is well defined aggregate elasticity of income as: 
 𝜀 =
1−𝜏
𝑧
𝑑𝑧
𝑑(1−𝜏)
  , where 𝑧  is taxable income and 𝑧 = 𝑦 − 𝑥, where 𝑦 is the real income, and 𝑥 is 
sheltered income 17,taxable income s used in the calculation for Pareto parameter 𝑎 =
𝑧
𝑧−?̅?
. Tax 
avoidance elasticity component is given as 𝜀1 =
1−𝜏
𝑧
𝑑𝑥
1−𝜏
 , and 𝜀2 =
1−𝜏
𝑧
𝑑𝑦
1−𝜏
 is the real labor supply 
elasticity. Now, when government raises slightly 𝜏 → 𝑑𝜏 there is: mechanical effect from the 
increase in taxes i.e. 𝑑𝑀 = ( 𝑧 − 𝑧∗)𝑑𝜏 , welfare effect 𝑑𝑊 = −?̅?𝑑𝑀 = −?̅?( 𝑧 − 𝑧∗)𝑑𝜏 , where 
social marginal weight for individual is :𝑔𝑖 = 𝐺
′(𝑢𝑖)𝑢𝑐
𝑖 /𝜆 , where 𝜆 is a multiplier of government 
                                                             
14 
(
𝑘
𝑤
)
𝑎
𝑤∙(
𝑎𝑘𝑎
𝑤1+𝑎
)
=
𝑘𝑎
𝑤𝑎
𝑤∙(
𝑎𝑘𝑎
𝑤1+𝑎
)
=
𝑘𝑎
𝑤𝑎
𝑤∙
𝑎𝑘𝑎
𝑤∙𝑤𝑎
=
1
𝑎
  
15 This is an expression for the marginal value of public funds to the government 
16 The social welfare function that uses as its measure of social welfare the utility of the worst-off member of 
society. The following argument can be used to motivate the Rawlsian social welfare function. 
17 Investments or investment accounts that provide favorable tax treatment , or activities and transactions that 
lower taxable income.  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3390397 
8 
 
constraint which is ∫ 𝜏(𝑤𝑙)𝑓(𝑤)𝑑𝑤 ≥ 𝐸 ,average income in economy is 𝑧̅ = ∫ 𝑧ℎ(𝑧)𝑑𝑧, ℎ(𝑧) is a 
density 
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝜏(𝑧)
= 𝜆, 𝑐 = ?̅? − 𝐸, while ?̅? social marginal weight for top earners is given as:           
?̅? =  
∫ 𝑔𝑖∙𝑧𝑖
𝑧∗∙∫ 𝑔𝑖
  , where 𝑧 − 𝑧∗ is the mechanical redistribution effect. And, the third effect is behavioral 
response of the top earners: 𝑑𝐵 = −
𝜏
1−𝜏
∙
1−𝜏
𝑧
∙
𝑑𝑧
𝑑(1−𝜏)
∙ 𝑧 ∙ 𝑑𝜏  = −
𝜏
1−𝜏
∙ 𝜀 ∙ 𝑧 ∙ 𝑑𝜏 . From here it can 
be derived Diamond (1998) optimal tax formula :
𝜏(𝑧)
1−𝜏(𝑧)
=
1
𝜀(𝑧)
∙ [
1−𝐹(𝑧)
𝑧∙𝐹(𝑧)
] ∙ [1 − 𝐺(𝑧)], this is 
distribution shape parameter 
1−𝐹(𝑧)
𝑧∙𝐹(𝑧)
 , 𝐺(𝑧) are social marginal welfare weights For numerical 
solutions of the Mirrless model (1971) , one can look up to Brewer, M., E. Saez, and A. Shephard 
(2010) ,  
Equation 6 
𝜏′𝑧(ℎ)
1 − 𝜏′𝑧(ℎ)
= (1 +
1
𝜀
)
1
ℎ𝑓(ℎ)
∫ (1 −
𝐺′𝑢(ℎ)
𝜆
) 𝑓(ℎ)𝑑ℎ
∞
ℎ
 
Where 𝜆 = ∫ 𝐺′(𝑢)𝑑ℎ.Few general conclusions about marginal tax rates in the literature appear:1. 
𝜏(𝑧(ℎ)) ≥ 0 , a in Mirrlees (1971), 2. 𝜏(𝑧(ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑡 ℎ)) = 0 (𝑓(ℎ)bounded above ,Sadka, (1976), 3. 
𝜏(𝑧(𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑠𝑡 ℎ)) = 0 (ℎ: 𝑦(ℎ) > 0),Seade,(1977). Akerlof (1978),introduces optimal redistribution 
system with and without tagging, in Mirrless(1971) –Fair (1971) model (those are separate papers),  
by allowing tax administration to treat different labeled (identified, tagged)18  groups of people who 
are in need  ,taxpayers (as opposed to beneficiaries) are denied the benefit of the transfer, and lump 
sum transfer is made to the tagged  people. The utility function here is: 𝑢 =
1
2
∗ max 𝑢[(𝑞𝐷 − 𝜏𝐷) −
𝛿 + 𝑢(𝑞𝐸 + 𝑡𝐸)] + 1/2 𝑢(𝑞𝐸 + 𝑡𝐸)   In previous expression 𝑞𝐷 , 𝑞𝐸 represents the output of the 
skilled and unskilled workers in difficult and easy jobs respectively. And, 𝜏𝐷  is a tax on income in 
difficult jobs, while 𝑡𝐸  transfer of income in easy jobs, 𝛿 reflects distaste of workers for difficult jobs.   
From negative tax19 formula, 𝑇 = −𝑎?̅? + 𝜏𝑦;  𝜏 = 𝛽𝑎 + 𝑔 , where 𝜏 is marginal tax rate ,𝑎  is the 
fraction of per capita income?̅? received by a person with zero gross income,𝛽 are tagged group of 
poor people from population, 𝛽𝑎 is a fraction of population that receives  minimum support. Skilled 
workers are assumed to work in difficult jobs, so their utility is: max 𝑢[(𝑞𝐷 − 𝜏𝐷) −
𝛿; 𝑢(𝑞𝐸 + 𝑡𝐸)],and 𝑢(𝑞𝐷 − 𝜏𝐷) − 𝛿 ≥ 𝑢(𝑞𝐸 + 𝑡𝐸),and then tax collections per skilled worker  equal 
transfers i.e. 𝜏𝐷 = 𝑡𝐸 , but if the skilled workers work in the easy jobs than the result would be zero 
𝑡𝐸 = 0 , if  𝑢(𝑞𝐷 − 𝜏𝐷) − 𝛿 < 𝑢(𝑞𝐸 + 𝑡𝐸). In the tax equal budget constraint: 𝑢(𝑞𝐷 − 𝜏𝐷
∗ ) − 𝛿 <
𝑢(𝑞𝐸 + 𝑡𝐸
∗), or 𝜏𝐷
∗ = 𝑡𝐸
∗  are optimal tax –cum-transfer rates. And now utility function becomes: 
𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑔∗ =
1
2
∗ max 𝑢[(𝑞𝐷 − 𝜏𝐷) − 𝛿 + 𝑢(𝑞𝐸 + 𝑡𝐸)] + 1/2(1 − 𝛽)  𝑢(𝑞𝐸 + 𝑡𝐸) + 1/2  𝛽𝑢(𝑞𝐸 + 𝑡)  
Subject to :𝜏𝐷 = (1 − 𝛽)𝑡𝐸 + 𝛽𝑡  , or transfers to easy jobs, if 𝑢(𝑞𝐷 − 𝜏𝐷) − 𝛿 ≥ 𝑢(𝑞𝐸 + 𝑡𝐸) and 
(2 − 𝛽)𝜏𝐸 + 𝛽𝑡 = 0 , if 𝑢(𝑞𝐷 − 𝜏𝐷) − 𝛿 < 𝑢(𝑞𝐸 + 𝑡𝐸).Generalization of Mirrless and Fair problem 
includes administrative costs for grouping (tagging ) people in different groups 𝑐(Λ), utility is to be 
maximized over different types of people 𝑥: 𝑢 = ∫ 𝑢𝑥𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥,where 𝑓(𝑥) denotes the distribution of 
people of type 𝑥,the group to which agent belongs is 𝜎 so 𝑢𝑥 = (𝑦 − 𝜏, 𝑥, 𝜎) , constrant for the utility 
maximization involves administrative costs also : ∫ 𝜏𝜎(𝑦(𝑥), 𝜎(𝑥))𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 𝑥 + 𝑐(Λ) = 0, 𝜎(𝑥) is a 
group to which individual belongs to. And other constraint: 𝑢[𝑤(𝑥, 𝜎)ℓ(𝑥, 𝜎) −
𝜏_𝜎(𝑤 (𝑥, 𝜎)ℓ(𝑥, 𝜎)), 𝑥, 𝜎] . Where 𝑤(𝑥, 𝜎) is a wage of a person with characteristics 𝑥 , that belongs 
                                                             
18 A system of tagging permits relatively high welfare payments with relatively low marginal rates of taxation.  
19 In economics, a negative income tax  is a welfare system within an income tax where people earning below a 
certain amount receive supplemental pay from the government instead of paying taxes to the government. 
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to a group 𝜎, and ℓ(𝑥, 𝜎) is a labor input , and this is generalization of Mirrless and Fair models with 
tagging.The effect of small tax reform in MIrrless (1971) model is examined in Brewer, M., E. Saez, and 
A. Shephard (2010) ,where indirect utility function is given as :𝑈(1 − 𝜏, 𝑅) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑧((1− 𝜏)𝑧 + 𝑅, 𝑧) 
,where 𝑧  represents the taxable income 𝑅 is a virtual income intercept, and 𝜏 is an imposed income 
tax. Marshalian labor supply is :𝑧 = 𝑧(1 − 𝜏, 𝑅), uncompensated elasticity of the supply is given 
as:𝜀𝑢 =
(1−𝜏)
𝑧
𝜕𝑧
𝜕(1−𝜏)
 , income effect is 𝜂 = (1 − 𝜏)
𝜕𝑧
𝜕𝑅
≤ 0.Hicksian supply of labor is given 
as:𝑧𝑐((1 − 𝜏, 𝑢)), this minimizes the cost in need to achieve slope 1 − 𝜏 , compensated elasticity now 
is : 𝜀𝑐 =
(1−𝜏)
𝑧
𝜕𝑧𝑐
𝜕(1−𝜏)
> 0, Slutsky equation now becomes: 
𝜕𝑧
𝜕(1−𝜏)
=
𝜕𝑧𝑐
𝜕(1−𝜏)
+ 𝑧
𝜕𝑧
𝜕𝑅
⇒ 𝜀𝑢 = 𝜀𝑐 + 𝜂, 
where 𝜂 represents income effect :𝜂 = (1 − 𝜏)
𝜕𝑧
𝜕𝑅
≤ 0 .With small tax reform taxes and revenue 
change i.e.:𝑑𝑈 = 𝑢𝑐 ∙ [−𝑧𝑑𝑡 + 𝑑𝑅] + 𝑑𝑧[(1 − 𝜏)𝑢𝑐 + 𝑢𝑧] = 𝑢𝑐 ∙ [−𝑧𝑑𝑡 + 𝑑𝑅].Change of taxes and 
its impact on the society is given as:𝑑𝑈𝑖 = −𝑢𝑐𝑑𝑇(𝑧𝑖). Envelope theorem here says :𝑈(𝜃) =
max
𝑥
𝐹(𝑥, 𝜃), 𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑐 > 𝐺(𝑥, 𝜃)  , and the preliminary result is :𝑈′(𝜃) =
𝜕𝐹
𝜕𝜃
(𝑥∗(𝜃), 𝜃 −
𝜆∗(𝜃)
𝜕𝐺
𝜕𝜃
𝑥∗(𝜃), 𝜃). Government is maximizing :0 = ∫𝐺′(𝑢𝑖)𝑢𝑐
𝑖 ∙ [(𝑍 − 𝑧𝑖) −
𝜏
𝑑(1−𝜏)
𝑒𝑍], mechanical 
effect is given as:𝑑𝑀 = [𝑧 − 𝑧∗]𝑑𝜏, welfare effect is :𝑑𝑊 = −?̅?𝑑𝑀 = −?̅?[𝑧 − 𝑧∗], and at last the 
behavioral response is :𝑑𝐵 = −
𝜏
1−𝜏
∙ 𝑒 ∙ 𝑧𝑑𝜏. And lets denote that:  
Equation 7 
𝑑𝑀 + 𝑑𝑊 + 𝑑𝐵 = 𝑑𝜏 [1 − ?̅?[𝑧 − 𝑧∗] − 𝑒
𝜏
1 − 𝜏
∙ 𝑧] 
When the tax is optimal these three effects should equal zero i.e. 𝑑𝑀 + 𝑑𝑊 + 𝑑𝐵 = 0 given 
that:
𝜏
1−𝜏
=
(1−?̅?)[𝑧−𝑧∗]
𝑒∙𝑧
 , and we got 𝜏 =
1−?̅?
1−?̅?+𝑎∙𝑒
, 𝑎 =
𝑧
𝑧−𝑧∗
,and 𝑑𝑀 = 𝑑𝜏[𝑧 − 𝑧∗] ≪ 𝑑𝐵 = 𝑑𝜏 ∙ 𝑒
𝜏
1−𝜏
∙
𝑧, кога 𝑧∗ > 𝑧𝑇  , where 𝑧𝑇  is a top earner income. Pareto distribution is given as: 
Equation 8 
1 − 𝐹(𝑧) = (
𝑘
𝑧
)
𝑎
, 𝑓(𝑧) = 𝑎 ∙
𝑘𝑎
𝑧1+𝑎
 
𝑎 is a thickness parameter and top income distribution is measured as: 
Equation 9 
𝑧(𝑧∗) =
∫ 𝑠𝑓(𝑠)𝑑𝑠
∞
𝑧∗
∫ 𝑓(𝑠)𝑑𝑠
∞
𝑧∗
=
∫ 𝑠−𝑎𝑑𝑠
∞
𝑧∗
∫ 𝑠−𝑎−1𝑑𝑠
∞
𝑧∗
=
𝑎
(𝑎 − 1)
∙ 𝑧∗ 
Empirically  𝑎 ∈ [1.5,3], 𝜏 =
1−?̅?
1−?̅?+𝑎∙𝑒
.General non-linear tax without income effects is given as: 
Equation 10 
𝑇′(𝑧𝑛)
1 − 𝑇′(𝑧𝑛)
=
1
𝑒
(
∫ (1 − 𝑔𝑚)𝑑𝐹(𝑚)
∞
𝑛
𝑧𝑛ℎ(𝑧𝑛)
) =
1
𝑒
(
1 − 𝐻(𝑧𝑛)
𝑧𝑛ℎ(𝑧𝑛)
) ∙ (1 − 𝐺((𝑧𝑛)) 
Where 𝐺((𝑧𝑛) =
∫ 𝑔𝑚𝑑𝐹(𝑚)
∞
𝑛
1−𝐹(𝑛)
 ,and 𝑔𝑚 = 𝐺′(𝑢𝑚)/𝑝 this is welfare weight of type 𝑚.But non-linear tax 
witn income effect takes into account small tax reform where tax rates change from 𝑑𝜏 to 
[𝑧∗ , 𝑧∗ + 𝑑𝑧∗].Every tax payer with income  𝑧 above 𝑧∗ pays additionaly  𝑑𝜏𝑑𝑧∗ valued by 
(1 − 𝑔(𝑧))𝑑𝜏𝑑𝑧∗.Mechanical effect is : 
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Equation 11 
𝑀 = 𝑑𝜏𝑑𝑧∗∫ (1 − 𝑔(𝑧))𝑑𝜏𝑑𝑧∗
∞
𝑧∗
 
Total income response is :𝐼 = 𝑑𝜏𝑑𝑧∗ ∫ (−𝜂𝑍
𝑇′(𝑧)
1−𝑇′(𝑧)
(𝑧)) ℎ(𝑧)𝑑𝑧
∞
𝑧∗
 . Change at the taxpayers form the 
additional tax is :𝑑𝑧 = −𝜀(𝑧)
𝑐 𝑇
′′𝑑𝑧
1−𝑇′
− 𝜂
𝑑𝜏𝑑𝑧∗
1−𝑇′(𝑧)
⇒ −𝜂
𝑑𝜏𝑑𝑧∗
1−𝑇′(𝑧)+𝑧𝜀(𝑧)
𝑐 𝑇′′(𝑧)
, if one sums up all effects can be 
obtained: 
Equation 12 
𝑇′(𝑧)
1 − 𝑇′(𝑧)
=
1
𝜀(𝑧)
𝑐 (
1 − 𝐻(𝑧∗)
𝑧∗ℎ(𝑧∗)
) × [∫ (1 − 𝑔(𝑧))
ℎ(𝑧)
1 − 𝐻(𝑧∗)
𝑑𝑧 +∫ −𝜂
𝑇′(𝑧)
1 − 𝑇′(𝑧)
ℎ∗(𝑧)
1 − 𝐻(𝑧∗)
𝑑𝑧
∞
𝑧∗
∞
𝑧∗
] 
With linear tax: 
?̇?𝑛
𝑧𝑛
=
1+𝜀(𝑛)
𝑢
𝑛
  and with non-linear tax: 
 
Equation 13 
?̇?𝑛
𝑧𝑛
=
1+ 𝜀(𝑛)
𝑢
𝑛
− ?̇?𝑛
𝑇′′(𝑧𝑛)
1 − 𝑇′′(𝑧𝑛)
𝜀𝑧(𝑛)
𝑐  
This model was later augmented with the migrations by Mirrless (1982).Migrations are of importance 
for the top incomes(brain drain). In the model earnings are fixed 𝑐 , and 𝑝(𝑐|𝑧) represents the number 
of residents earning 𝑧, while 𝑐 = 𝑧 − 𝑇(𝑧) represents the disposable income. Now , one small tax 
reform 𝑑𝑇(𝑧) ,for those earning income 𝑧. Mechanical effect of net-welfare is : 𝑀 +𝑊 =
(1 − 𝑔(𝑧))𝑃(𝑐|𝑧)𝑑𝑇 .Migration equal taxes average or total:𝑀 +𝑊 =
𝜕𝑃(𝑐|𝑧)
𝜕𝐶
𝑧−𝑇(𝑧)
𝑃(𝑐|𝑧)
 .Cost of imposing 
taxes are :𝐵 = −
𝑇(𝑧)
𝑧−𝑇(𝑧)
 .Optimal tax applies when : 𝑀 +𝑊 +𝐵 = 0.And the formula for the optimal 
tax with migrations becomes : 
Equation 14 
𝑇(𝑧)
𝑧 − 𝑇(𝑧)
1
𝜂𝑚(𝑧)
∙ (1 − 𝑔(𝑧)) 
𝜂𝑚(𝑧) (elasticity of taxable top income) depends on the size of jurisdiction; it’s large for the cities, and 
its small (zero) for the world, redistribution is easier in larger jurisdictions. Formula for maximizing the 
revenues from top incomes is : 
Equation 15 
𝜏 =
1
1 + 𝑎 ∙ 𝑒 + ?̅?𝑚
 
Where ?̅?𝑚   is elasticity of the top earners towards disposable income. 
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Ramsey model (1927) in theory  
 
In Ramsey (1927), utility function is of type:𝑈 = 𝑓(𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑝3, … . . , 𝑌), 𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑝3,… .. are prices and 𝑌 is 
income. Standard result is known as Roy’s identity , Roy (1947)20, is :
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝑖
= −𝑄𝑖
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝑌
 . With the horizontal 
demand curves, price of the producers is fixed, change in the goods price is only equal to the change 
in taxes. Than, 𝑑𝑝1 = 𝑑𝑡1 > 0, 𝑑𝑝2 = 𝑑𝑡2 < 0.Change in taxes must satisfy the following equation: 
𝑑𝑈 =
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝑖
𝑑𝜏1 +
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝑝2
𝑑𝜏2 = 0,and 
𝑑𝜏2
𝑑𝜏1
= −
𝑄1
𝑄2
, , change in the revenues caused by the change in taxes 
is :
𝜕(𝜏1𝑄1)
𝜕𝑡1
= 𝑄1 +
𝜏1𝑑𝑄
𝑑𝑝1
= 𝑄1 (1 +
𝜏1𝑑𝑄1𝑝1
𝑝1𝑑𝑝1𝑄1
) = 𝑄1 (1 −
𝜏1
𝑝1
𝜀𝑢
1), where 𝜀𝑢
1 represents the compensated 
elasticity of the demand for good 1. Change of revenues as a result of change of taxes on good 2 is: 
𝜕(𝑡2𝑄2)
𝜕𝑡2
= 𝑄2 (1 −
𝜏2
𝑝2
𝜀𝑢
2). Total change in revenues is given as: 
 
Equation 16 
𝑑𝑅
𝑑𝑡1
= 𝑄1 (1 −
𝜏1
𝑝1
𝜀𝑢
1) +
𝑑𝜏2
𝑑𝜏1
𝑄2 (1 −
𝜏2
𝑝2
𝜀𝑢
2) = 𝑄1 [(1 −
𝜏1
𝑝1
𝜀𝑢
1) − (1 −
𝜏2
𝑝2
𝜀𝑢
2)] = 𝑄1 [
𝜏2
𝑝2
𝜀𝑢
2 −
𝜏1
𝑝1
𝜀𝑢
1] 
With the optimal tax structure, this identity must holds:
𝑡2
𝑝2
𝜀𝑢
2 −
𝑡1
𝑝1
𝜀𝑢
1 = 0, for the linear demand 
curve results is :
𝑡
𝑝
=
𝑘𝑄
𝑏𝑝
=
𝑘
𝜀𝑢
𝑑. This conclusion is supported by the findings of Feldstein (1978), “when 
lump-sum taxation is not available (or, equivalently, when a tax on leisure is impossible), all other 
commodities should be taxed at differential rates (positive and negative) that depend on their 
relative demand elasticities and cross elasticities”.Ramsey model was found useful in life cycle 
models, for best reference see Atkinson, A.B. and  Stiglitz,J. (1976),Atkinson, A.B. and A. Sandmo 
(1980), Atkinson, A.B. and Stiglitz,J. (1980). Here the problem of utility maximization is given as: 
𝑢 (𝑞, 𝑤(1 −  𝜏𝐿))  =  max𝑐1,𝑐2,𝑙   𝑢(𝑐1, 𝑐2, 𝑙) s.t. 𝑐1  + 𝑐2/(1 +  𝑟(1 −  𝜏𝐾  ))  =  𝑤𝑙(1 −  𝜏𝐿), 
where 𝑞 =
1
1 + 𝑟(1 − 𝜏𝐾 )
;   𝑝 =
1
1 + 𝑟
 , are the prices after taxation respectively on 𝑐2 .Optimal tax 
rates could be obtained by solving standard Ramsey problem:max
𝜏𝐿,,𝜏𝐾 
𝑢 (𝑞, 𝑤(1 − 𝜏𝐿)) subject to 
𝑤𝑙𝜏𝐿   + (𝑞 −  𝑝)𝑐2  ≥  𝑔 (𝜆)𝑚𝑎𝑥, where 𝑔 is exogenous tax requirement. When the compensated 
elasticity of the supply is :
𝑟𝜏𝐾
1+𝑟
= (𝜎𝐿2  − 𝜎22)  =  
𝜏𝐿
1 − 𝜏𝐿
 (𝜎𝐿𝐿   − 𝜎2𝐿), where following applies also: 
σ22  =  (
q
c2
) ∂c2
c/ ∂q <  0  ;σL2  =  (
q
l
)∂lc/ ∂q;σ2L  =  (
w(1 − τL)
c2
)∂c2
c/ ∂(w(1 − τL)) . Optimal tax 
formula can be simplified :
𝑟𝜏𝐾
1 + 𝑟
𝜎22  =
𝜏𝐿
1 − 𝜏𝐿
𝜎𝐿𝐿. Inverse elasticity rule says if  : 𝜎𝐿𝐿  <<  |𝜎22|  than 
𝜏𝑘  will be of relative small size to 𝜏𝐿 .Feldstein (1978) makes famous theoretical argument why 𝜎22 
can be large even if 𝜀𝑢 = (
𝑞
𝑠
) 𝜕𝑠/𝜕𝑞   [uncompensated savings elasticity] is zero:Budget 𝑐1  +  𝑞𝑐2  =
 𝑤(1 −  𝜏𝐿)𝑙 +  𝑦, Slutsky equation when endowment is zero is :
𝜕𝑐2
𝑐
𝜕𝑞
=
𝜕𝑐2
𝜕𝑞
+
𝑐2𝜕𝑐2
𝜕𝑦
⇒ 𝜎22   =  𝜀2𝑞
𝑢  +
𝑞𝜕𝑐2
𝜕𝑦𝑐2
=
𝑠
𝑞
 , 𝜀2𝑞
𝑢  =  (
𝑞
𝑐2
)𝜕𝑐2/𝜕𝑞 =  𝜀𝑠𝑞
𝑢  −  1 ⇒ 𝜎22  =  𝜀𝑠𝑞
𝑢  −  1 +  𝑞𝜕𝑐2/𝜕𝑦𝑐1  +  𝑞𝑐2  =  𝑤(1 −
 𝜏𝐿)𝑙  +  𝑦 ⇒ 𝜕𝑐1/𝜕𝑦 +  𝑞𝜕𝑐2/𝜕𝑦 =  𝑤(1 − 𝜏𝐿)𝜕𝑙/𝜕𝑦 +  1 ≈  1𝜎22  ≅  𝜀𝑠𝑞
𝑢  −  𝜕𝑐1/𝜕𝑦 ≅
 −𝜕𝑐1/𝜕𝑦 ≤  −0.75. 
 
 
                                                             
20 The lemma relates the ordinary (Marshallian) demand function to the derivatives of the indirect utility 
function. 
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Optimal minimum wage with no and with taxes and transfers  
 
In the model with constant returns to scale there is no profit at equilibrium, and following Lee,D., 
Saez,E. (2012) ,optimal wage of agent 𝑖 equals marginal productivity i.e. 𝑤𝑖 =
𝜕𝐹(ℎ𝑙,ℎℎ)
𝜕ℎ𝑙
 , where ℎ𝑙 , ℎℎ  
represent the low skilled and high skilled workers respectively. Because there are zero profits at 
equilibrium here because of the constant returns to scale that means that:Π = 𝐹(ℎ𝑙 , ℎℎ) − 𝑤𝑙ℎ𝑙 −
𝑤ℎℎℎ = 0,consumption equal to 𝑐𝑖 = 𝑤𝑖 − 𝜏𝑖,agents are heterogeneous and the costs for their 
efforts are given as :  𝜃 = (𝜃𝑙 , 𝜃ℎ) ,where (𝜃𝑙 , 𝜃ℎ) are the costs of low and high skilled workers, low 
skills and high skills also means different occupations. This also implies that:
𝑤𝑙
𝑤ℎ
= 𝐹ℎ(1, ℎ𝑙 , ℎℎ)/
𝐹1(1, ℎ𝑙 , ℎℎ),low skilled labor demand elasticity is given as :𝜀𝑙 = 𝐷𝑙(𝑤𝑙) ∙ − (
𝑤𝑙
ℎ𝑙
), resource constraint 
in the economy21 is given as : 𝑐0ℎ𝑜 + 𝑐𝑙ℎ𝑙 + 𝑐ℎ𝑙ℎ ≤ 𝑤ℎ𝑙 +𝑤ℎ𝑙ℎ.Social welfare function in this case is 
given as : 𝑆𝑊𝐹 = (1 − ℎ𝑙 − ℎℎ)𝐺(𝑐0) + ∫ 𝐺(𝑐𝑙 −Θl
𝜃𝑙) 𝑑𝐻(𝜃) + ∫ 𝐺(𝑐ℎ −Θh
𝜃ℎ) 𝑑𝐻(𝜃) 
22.Since 
there are no income effects 𝜆 = 𝑔𝑜ℎ0 + 𝑔𝑙ℎ𝑙 + 𝑔ℎℎℎ = 1 ,where 𝜆 is the marginal value of public 
funds, and marginal weights are defined as 𝑔0 = 𝐺
′(𝑐0)/𝜆  and 𝑔𝑖 = ∫ 𝐺
′(𝑐𝑖 − 𝜃𝑖)𝑑𝐻(𝜃)/𝜆(ℎ𝑖)Θ𝑖
. 
The concavity of the social welfare function implies that 𝑔0 > 𝑔𝑙 > 𝑔ℎ.If there are no taxes and 
transfers then minimal wage will equal ?̅? = 𝑤𝑙
∗ + 𝑑𝑤𝑙  , where 𝑑𝑤𝑙  are transfer from other factors to 
minimal workers. If the minimal wage increases we are facing changes :𝑑𝑤𝑙 , 𝑑𝑤ℎ , 𝑑ℎ𝑙 , 𝑑ℎℎ.And then 
:dΠ = ∑ (
𝜕𝑤𝑖
𝜕ℎ𝑖
) 𝑑ℎ𝑖 − 𝑤𝑙𝑑ℎ𝑙 −𝑤ℎℎℎ = 𝑤𝑙𝑑ℎ𝑙 +𝑤ℎℎℎ = 0i . FOC of the previous expression is given 
as :  
Equation 17 
𝑑𝑆𝑊𝐹
𝑑?̅?
= (−
𝑑ℎ𝑙
𝑤𝑙
−
𝑑ℎℎ
𝑤ℎ
)𝐺(0) +
𝑑ℎ𝑙
𝑑?̅?
𝐺(0) +
𝑑ℎℎ
𝑑?̅?
𝐺(0) + ∫ 𝐺′(𝑐𝑙 −Θl
𝜃𝑙) 𝑑𝐻(𝜃) +
𝑑𝑤ℎ
𝑑?̅?
∫ 𝐺′(𝑐ℎ −Θh
𝜃ℎ) 𝑑𝐻(𝜃) or, 
𝑑𝑆𝑊𝐹
𝑑?̅?
= 𝜆ℎ𝑙(𝑔𝑙 − 𝑔ℎ) > 0.  
Now if government can introduce taxes and transfer at optimum we have 𝑔𝑙 = 1  full redistribution 
to low skilled workers, and 𝑔𝑜ℎ0 + 𝑔𝑙ℎ𝑙 + 𝑔ℎℎℎ = 1. If the consumption changes with wages than 
Δ𝑐𝑖 = 𝑐𝑖 − 𝑐0 and the resource constraint is given as : ℎ𝑙(𝑤𝑙 − Δ𝑐𝑙) + ℎℎ(𝑤ℎ − Δ𝑐ℎ) ≥
𝑐0.Lagrangian for the previous function is given as : ℒ =  𝑆𝑊 + 𝜆 [ℎ𝑙 ·  (𝑤1𝑙  − 𝜆𝑐𝑙)  + ℎℎ ·  (𝑤ℎ  −
𝜆𝑐ℎ) −  𝑐0].Skills ratio doesn’t change with taxes and so 
ℎ𝑙
ℎℎ
= 𝜌 (
𝑤𝑙
𝑤ℎ
) , and 
𝑑ℒ
𝑑𝑐0
= 𝜆(𝑔𝑜ℎ0 + 𝑔𝑙ℎ𝑙 +
𝑔ℎℎℎ − 1) ,at the optimum 𝑔𝑙 = 1 . And 
𝑑ℒ
𝑑𝑐1
= ∫ 𝐺(𝑐0 + Δ𝑐1 −Θl
𝜃𝑙) 𝑑𝐻(𝜃) − 𝜆ℎ𝑙 = 𝜆(𝑔𝑙 − 1)ℎ𝑙. 
Now the optimal tax rate when in a model there are extensive labour supply responses is: 
𝑇0
∗ =
1
1+
ℎ𝑙𝑒0
ℎ𝑙+ℎℎ
 , where 𝑒0 represents the elasticity of transition from unemployed to low skill , and 𝑇0
∗ 
is the first tax at state 0, marginal tax rate at state 1 is  𝑇1
∗ =
1
1+
ℎ𝑙𝑒1
ℎ𝑙+ℎℎ
. And 𝑒1 is the elasticity of 
transition from low skilled to high skilled employee. Transitional taxes from unemployed to low 
skilled and from low skilled to high skilled are given as :𝑇0 = 1 −
𝑦𝑙−𝑦0
𝑤ℎ
 and 𝑇1 = 1−
𝑦𝑙−𝑦ℎ
𝑤ℎ−𝑤𝑙
. 𝑦𝑙 − 𝑦0 
is the after tax income gap, same applies for 𝑦𝑙 − 𝑦ℎ. In the Stiglitz (1982) model of endogenous 
wages high skill and low skill workers have same amount of working hours 𝑙𝑖. The production 
                                                             
21 𝑐0ℎ𝑜 are consumption and skills of unemployed agent  
22 𝐻(𝜃) = 𝐻(𝜃𝑙 , 𝜃ℎ) 
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function is of constant returns of scale also. Wages here are equal to the marginal product of labour 
:𝑤𝑖 =
𝜕𝐹(𝑙𝑙,𝑙ℎ)
𝜕𝑙𝑖
, the resource constraint in the economy is given as:∑ 𝑐𝑖 ≤ 𝐹(𝑙𝑙 , 𝑙ℎ)𝑖 .Production 
function follows Mirrlees (1971) assumptions and it linear :𝐹(𝑙𝑙 , 𝑙ℎ) = 𝜃𝑙𝑙𝑙 + 𝜃ℎ𝑙ℎ,where 𝜃 
represents the ability of an agent 𝑖  and wages are 𝑤𝑖. Linear welfare weights are 𝜓𝑙 , 𝜓ℎ  and if 𝜓𝑙 >
𝜓ℎ  in equilibrium .the following Lagrangian applies here: 
Equation 18 
ℒ = 𝜓𝑙𝑢(𝑐𝑙 , 𝑙𝑙) + 𝜓ℎ𝑢(𝑐ℎ , 𝑙ℎ) + 𝜆 (𝐹(𝑙𝑙 , 𝑙ℎ) −∑𝑐𝑖
𝑖
) + 𝜇 (𝑢(𝑐ℎ , 𝑙ℎ) − 𝑢 (𝑐𝑙 ,
𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑙
𝑤ℎ
))
+∑𝜂𝑖(𝑤𝑖 − 𝐹𝑖)(𝑙𝑙 , 𝑙ℎ)
𝑖
 
𝜆 is the marginal value of public funds, and 𝜇 is value of relaxing the incentive constraint for type 
H,and how they are related :(𝜓ℎ + 𝜇)𝑢𝑐(𝑐ℎ , 𝑙ℎ) = 𝜆,or (𝜓ℎ + 𝜇)𝑢𝑙(𝑐ℎ , 𝑙ℎ) = −𝜆𝐹ℎ(𝑙ℎ, 𝑙𝑙) +
∑ 𝜂𝑖𝐹𝑖ℎ(𝑙𝑙 , 𝑙ℎ)𝑖 .Marginal taxes or labor wedge
23 is given as: 
Equation 19 
𝑇′(𝑤ℎ) = 1 +
𝑢𝑙(𝑐ℎ,𝑙ℎ)
𝑢𝑐(𝑐ℎ,𝑙ℎ)𝑤ℎ
 or 𝑇′(𝑤ℎ) = 1 +
−𝜆𝐹ℎ(𝑙ℎ,𝑙𝑙)+∑ 𝜂𝑖𝐹𝑖ℎ(𝑙𝑙,𝑙ℎ)𝑖
𝜆𝐹ℎ(𝑙ℎ,𝑙𝑙)
=
∑ 𝜂𝑖𝐹𝑖ℎ(𝑙𝑙,𝑙ℎ)𝑖
𝜆𝐹ℎ(𝑙ℎ,𝑙𝑙)
 
First order conditions are given as:  
−𝜇𝑢𝑙 (𝑐𝑙 ,
𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑙
𝑤ℎ
)
𝑙𝑙
𝑤ℎ 
+ 𝜂𝑙 = 0  and 𝜇𝑢𝑙 (𝑐𝑙 ,
𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑙
𝑤ℎ
)
𝑤𝑙𝑙𝑙
𝑤ℎ 
2 + 𝜂ℎ = 0 
Because {𝑢𝑙 < 0; 𝜂𝑙 < 0; 𝜂ℎ > 0} ⇒ 𝐹𝑙 > 0; 𝐹ℎ < 0, ; ∑ 𝜂𝑖𝐹𝑖ℎ(𝑙𝑙 , 𝑙ℎ)𝑖 < 0 , this means that the 
marginal tax rate 𝑇′(𝑤ℎ) < 0,which says  top earners are subsidized at the margin because their 
labor raises the wages of lower earners.  
Numerical examples of optimal taxation (review) 
 
In this section we are trying to explain previous theory by following numerical examples or some 
using real historical data from developed countries. In the first example Mankiw NG, Weinzierl M, 
Yagan D.(2009) , they are using log-normal [0,1] or Pareto normal distribution with CDF : 
Equation 20 
𝐹(𝑥) =
∫
1
𝑧𝜎√2𝜋
𝑒𝑥𝑝 [−
1
2
(
𝑙𝑛𝑧 − 𝜇
𝜎
)
2
] 𝑑𝑧
𝑥
𝑎
∫
1
𝑧𝜎√2𝜋
𝑒𝑥𝑝 [−
1
2
(
𝑙𝑛𝑧 − 𝜇
𝜎
)
2
] 𝑑𝑧
𝑏
𝑎
 
And PDF : 
𝑓(𝑥) =
1
𝑥𝜎√2𝜋
𝑒𝑥𝑝 [−
1
2
(
𝑙𝑛𝑥 − 𝜇
𝜎
)
2
]
∫
1
𝑧𝜎√2𝜋
𝑒𝑥𝑝 [−
1
2
(
𝑙𝑛𝑧 − 𝜇
𝜎
)
2
] 𝑑𝑧
𝑏
𝑎
 
And the Lognormal-Pareto density is derived from : 
                                                             
23 Average labor wedge measures the extent to which imposed taxes on labor income discourage employment.  
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Equation 21 
𝑓(𝑥) =
 𝛼𝜃𝛼
(𝑥 − 𝑏)𝛼+1
; 𝑥 ≫ 𝜃 + 𝑏 
Where 𝛼 > 0, 𝜃 + 𝑏 > 0, ∫ 𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 = 0; 𝑓1(𝜃 + 𝑏) = 𝑓2(𝜃 + 𝑏)
∞
𝛼
 and 𝑓′1(𝜃 + 𝑏) = 𝑓′2(𝜃 + 𝑏), see 
Teodorescu,S.(2010). Truncated Lognormal-Pareto density is given as: 
Equation 22 
𝑓𝐿𝑃
𝑐 (𝑥) =
{
 
 
 
 1
[1 +Φ(𝑘)]√2𝜋(𝑥 − 𝛼)𝜎
exp [−
1
2
(
ln(𝑥 − 𝛼) − 𝜇
𝜎
)
2
] ; 𝛼 < 𝑥 ≤ 𝜃 + 𝑏
𝛼𝜃𝛼
[1 + Φ(𝑘)](𝑥 − 𝑏)𝛼+1
; 𝜃 + 𝑏 ≤ 𝑥 < ∞
}
 
 
 
 
 
 
Where 𝛼 =
𝜃
𝜃+𝑏−𝛼
[1 +
ln(𝜃+𝑏−𝛼)−𝜇
𝜎2
 ] − 1 and 𝑘 =
ln(𝜃+𝑏−𝛼)−𝜇
𝜎
 , where 𝜎 > 0 , 𝜇 ∈ ℝ. Some of the 
parameters used in the model are explained below : 
Description of the model 1 
Utility parameters are : 𝛾 =  1.5; 𝛼 =  2.55; 𝜎 =  3. Utility function is given as: 
 
Equation 23 
𝑢 =
𝑐1−𝛾 − 1
1 − 𝛾
−
𝛼𝜎
𝜎
 
Adjusting for marginal tax rates half-way schedule is 24: 
Equation 24 
 𝑡𝑎𝑥_𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔 =  
(𝑡𝑎𝑥_𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔 +  𝑡𝑎𝑥_𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔_𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒) 
2
 
Figure 1 MTR schedule and distribution of wages  
 
From the previous graph one can see that for the top earners marginal tax rate equal zero, as is 
predicted in Mirrless (1971). Next , as representative or seminal paper in the numerical methods 
                                                             
24 This part contains part of the MATAB code used for computation in Mankiw NG, Weinzierl M, Yagan 
D.(2009). 
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used to calculate optimal taxation models is this one based on the Aiyagari model (1994) and 
Aiyagari model (1995) with infinitely-lived households, labour endowment shocks  l(t) following an 
AR(1) process, where HH's solve both the consumption-savings problem and labour supply problem. 
HH's can save via capital K at interest rate r (endogenously determined) but cannot borrow. HH's 
have convex preferences and the government imposes labour and capital income tax as well as 
consumption tax. The government uses tax revenues to finance an exogenous level of G 
(government spending) and a representative firm maximizes their profits given aggregate capital K 
aggregate labour N, the wage rate w and depreciation delta. Individuals are subject to exogenous 
income shocks. These shocks are not fully insurable because of the lack of a complete set of Arrow-
Debreu contingent claims, Arrow , K., (1953). Incomplete markets case is when at date 0 there is 
trade on 𝐾 ≤ 𝑆 assets, i.e. number of Arrow-Debreu securities is less or equal than the states of 
nature25. 
Description of the model 2  
Parameters of the benchmark model are : 
𝑧 =  1;- total factor productivity ;𝛼 =  0.4;    - production function parameter (share of production 
due to capital) ;𝛿 =  0.08;   - proportion of capital saved today for the next period, 𝛽  = 0.96;   -
discount factor ;𝜌   =  0.90; - parameters of labor endowment shock process l(t), and 𝜌 being the 
autocorrelation coefficient for the AR(1) process:  𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑙(𝑡 + 1)) = 𝜌 ∗  𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑙(𝑡))  + 𝜖(𝑡),where 
𝜎 =  0.20;  𝜖(𝑡) is normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation 𝜎. 𝜏𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ  =  0.3;   
labour and capital income tax rate for benchmark , 𝜏𝑐𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ  = 0.075;   consumption tax rate for 
benchmark.  𝜆 =  2; % utility function parameter for HH preferences 𝜇 =  0.10;  parameter used for 
determining equilibrium interest rate and NA = 400;  is the number of intervals in A grid-space, for 
assets (analogous to K). and NL  = 5; is number of "l" states, for labour efficiency endowment 
(analgous to Z).Initial value function is V_benchmark(1:NL,1:NA) = 0. Intial guess for the interest rate 
is : dist_r = 1;𝑟 =
1
𝛽
 −  1 −  0.001; 𝑟 =  0.0379.Results for this section are  𝐾𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ     =
7.428726;𝑁𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ  = 1.1838
27; 𝐺𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ  = 1.119228; 𝑌𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ  =2.4679; 𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ  =
7.428729;𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑣𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ  = −33.0068
30;𝜏𝑐𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ  =     0.0750
31. A value function is often 
denoted v() or V(). Its value is the present discounted value, in consumption or utility terms, of the 
choice represented by its arguments. The classic example, from Stokey, N., Lucar,R.. and Prescott 
,E.(1989), is: 
Equation 25 
𝑣(𝑘)  =  𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑘′ { 𝑢(𝑘, 𝑘′)  + 𝛽𝑣(𝑘′) } 
 
where k is current capital, k' is the choice of capital for the next (discrete time) period, u(k, k') is the 
utility from the consumption implied by k and k', 𝛽 is the period-to-period discount factor.In the 
reformed economy new values of some of the parameters are : 𝜏𝑦𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚  =  0; here we set the labour 
                                                             
25 When security is sold, when 𝑠 state occurs, money is transferred in a way determined by the securities, and 
the allocation of commodities occurs at market in a usual way, without further risk bearing.  
26 Benchmark capital  
27 Benchmark labor  
28 Governments balanced budget  
29 Aggregate benchmark consumption  
30 Initial guess for value function  
31 Consumption tax benchmark value  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3390397 
16 
 
and capital income tax rate for the reform economy as 0.And 𝜏𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚  =  0.1507;  % here we set the 
consumption tax for the reform economy according to the definition:                  
Equation 26 
𝜏𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚 =
𝐺𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ
𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ
=
1.1192
7.4287
≈ 0,150658930903119 
In the reform economy expected results are: 𝐾𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚     = 9.1932;𝑁𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚  = 1.1838; 𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚  =
1.1192;𝑌𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚  = 2.6875;𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚  = 9.1932;𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑣𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚  =
−26.5039;𝜏𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚  =     0.1217. 
Equilibrium interest rate and wage rate for the benchmark economy: r=0.0529 ;  w=1.2508.Equilibrium 
interest rate and wage rate for the reform economy:  𝑟 =     0.0370    𝑤 = 1.3617.Next, equations 
about the changes between benchmark and reform economies are given; 
1. ∆𝐾 =  (𝐾𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚  −  𝐾𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ)/𝐾𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ  ) .∗  100; 
2. ∆𝑌 =  ((𝑌𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚  − 𝑌𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ) / 𝑌𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ  ) .∗  100; 
3. ∆𝑎𝑔𝑔𝐶 =  ((𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚  −  𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ) /𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ)  ∗  100; 
4. ∆𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑉 =  𝑎𝑏𝑠 (
𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑣𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚 − 𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑣𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ
(𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑣𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ)
) ∗  100; 
5. ∆𝑟 =  ((𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚  −  𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑟𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ) / (𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑟𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ)  ∗  100; 
6. ∆𝑤 =  (
(𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑤𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚  − 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑤𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ)
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑤𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ
) ∗  100; 
Table 1 Changes between benchmark and reform economies 
 
 
Figure 2 Welfare gains of each state  
 
On the previous graphs are presented welfare gains from each of the five states, for which 
transitional probabilities were calculated, these are the number of "l" states, for labor efficiency 
endowment. 
K Y aggr C aggr V r w 
237.521 88.983 237.521 197.019 -300.839 88.724 
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Table 2 Transition probabilities matrix (benchmark model) 
0.8491 0.1509 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0195 0.8962 0.0843 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 0.0427 0.9147 0.0427 0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0843 0.8962 0.0195 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1509 0.8491 
 
 
Table 3 Transition probabilities matrix (reform model) 
0.8491 0.1509 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 
0.0195 0.8962 0.0843 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 0.0427 0.9147 0.0427 0.0000 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0843 0.8962 0.0195 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1509 0.8491 
 
Recall that the value function describes the best possible value of the objective, as a function of the 
state 𝑥. 
Figure 3 Value functions (benchmark economy) 
 
Figure 4 Value functions (reform economy)  
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Description of model 3  
This is dynamic Ramsey taxation model32 and the model parameters are : 
𝜎 =  2; 𝛽  =  0.99; 𝜃 = 0 .38; 𝛿  =  0.08; 𝛼 =  0.30; 𝐴     =   10; . In this model utility of the 
representative agent with preferences is : 
Equation 27 
𝑢(𝑐, 𝑙) =
1
1 − 𝜎
[𝑐𝜃(1 − 𝑙)1−𝜃] 1−𝜎    
The discount factor is 𝛽 . technology is Cobb-Douglas with : 
Equation 28 
𝐹(𝑘, 𝑙) = 𝐴𝑘𝛼𝑙1−𝛼 
Steady state values of the variables of interest are given as: 
1. 𝑅 =
1
𝛽
  
2. 𝑟 =
𝑅−1
1−𝑘
+ 𝛿 
3. 
𝑘
𝑙
= (
𝑟
𝛼𝐴
)
1
𝛼−1
 
4. 𝑤 = 𝐴(1 − 𝛼) (
𝑘
𝑙
)
𝛼
 
5. 
𝑐
𝑙
= 𝐴𝐹 (
𝑘
𝑙
, 1) − 𝛿 (
𝑘
𝑙
) = 𝐴 (
𝑘
𝑙
)
𝛼
− 𝛿 (
𝑘
𝑙
) 
6. 𝑙 =
𝜃𝑤 
(1−𝜃)(
𝑐
𝑙
)+𝜃𝑤 
 
7. 𝑘 =
𝑘
𝑙
𝑙 
8. 𝑐 =
𝑐
𝑙
𝑙 
9. 𝑦 = 𝐴𝑘𝛼𝑙1−𝛼 
Evolution of capital around steady-state shows that 𝑘 = 𝐼 + (1 − 𝛿)𝑘 or that 𝛿 =
1
𝑘
 .In  2007 in US 
economy investment accounted of  3.8 trillions US/dollars , capital was 47.9 trillions/US dollars . This 
implies that  𝛿 = 0.079. Now: 
Equation 29 
𝛽 = 𝑅−1 = (1 + (1 − 𝑘)(𝑟 − 𝛿))
−1
= (1 + (1 − 𝑘) (𝑎 (
𝑘
𝑦
)
−1
− 𝛿)
−1
  
By assumption 𝛼 = 0.33,and for the labor tax we have : 
Equation 30 
(1 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜏𝑙)𝑦
𝑐
=
1 − 𝜃
𝜃
𝑙
1 − 𝑙
  
                                                             
32 MATLAB code written by Florian Scheuer, 2007    
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If  𝑙 = 0.31  and labor income tax is  𝜏𝑙 = 0.28, consumption in  2007 were 9.8 trillions us/dollars  
leads to that 𝜃 = 0.39, and now we know : 
Equation 31 
𝐴 =
𝑦
𝑘𝛼𝑙1−𝛼
= 8.6 
Steady state value of capital is given as: 
Equation 32 
?̃?(𝑘(𝑘)) =
1
(1 − 𝛽)(1 − 𝛿)
[𝑐(𝑘)𝜃(1 − 𝑙(𝑘))
1−𝜃
]
1−𝜎
 
We can compare this value ?̃?(𝑘(𝑘)) with the one where value of the capital tax is zero ?̃?(𝑘(0)).  
Equation 33 
1
(1 − 𝛽)(1 − 𝛿)
[1 + 𝜆(𝑘)𝑐(𝑘)𝜃(1 − 𝑙(𝑘))
1−𝜃
]
1−𝜎
= ?̃?(𝑘(0)) 
As soon as the capital income tax is zero, by the Bellman equation  : 
Equation 34 
𝑉(𝑘) = max
𝑐,𝑙𝑘′
𝑢(𝑐, 𝑙) + 𝛽𝑉 (𝑘′) 
Subject to constraints: 
Equation 35 
𝑐 + 𝑘′ = 𝐹(𝑘, 𝑙) + (1 − 𝛿)𝑘 
Marginal utilities for the consumption and labor are given as: 
Equation 36 
𝑢𝑐  (𝑐, 𝑙) = [𝑐
𝜃   (1 −  𝑙)1−𝜃]
−𝜎
 𝜃𝑐  𝜃−1 (1 −  𝑙)1−𝜃 ;𝑢𝑙  (𝑐, 𝑙) = − [𝑐
𝜃  (1 −  𝑙)1−𝜃]
𝜎
 𝑐𝜃  (1 −
 𝜃)(1 −  𝑙)−𝜃 
Intertemporal optimality condition is given as: 
Equation 37 
𝑤[𝑐𝜃(1 − 𝑙)1−𝜃]
−𝜎
𝜃𝑐𝜃−1(1 − 𝑙)1−𝜃 = [𝑐𝜃(1 − 𝑙)1−𝜃]
−𝜎
𝑐𝜃(1 − 𝜃)(1 − 𝑙)−𝜃 ⇒ 𝑤𝜃𝑐𝜃−1(1 − 𝑙)1−𝜃
= 𝑐𝜃(1 − 𝜃)(1 − 𝑙)−𝜃 ⇒ 𝑤𝜃(1 − 𝑙) = 𝑐(1 − 𝜃) ⇒ 𝑤𝜃(1 − 𝑙) =
𝑐
𝑙
𝑙(1 − 𝜃) ⇒ 𝑙
=
𝜃𝑤 
(1 − 𝜃) (
𝑐
𝑙
) + 𝜃𝑤  
33 
 
                                                             
33  𝛽𝑡𝑢(𝑐𝑡 , 𝑙𝑡) = 𝜆𝑞𝑡;𝛽
𝑡+1𝑢(𝑐𝑡+1 , 𝑙𝑡+1) = 𝜆𝑞𝑡+1; 𝛽
𝑡𝑢𝑙(𝑐𝑡 , 𝑙𝑡) = −𝜆𝑞𝑡𝑤𝑡 
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Next some of the previous calculations are calculated in MATLAB : 
Figure 5  Steady state value of consumption, investment and output as a function of grid of the capital tax  kappa=0 
 
Figure 6 Steady state value of consumption, investment and output as a function of grid of the capital tax  kappa=0.5 
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Conclusion/s  
 
The theory of optimal taxation represents the study of designing and implementing a tax that 
maximizes a social welfare function subject to some economic constraints. This paper made attempt 
to review the past and the current literature on the optimal tax theory, empirical and theoretical. 
The developments of the tax theory have improved the tax policies in the past. For instance, 
worldwide trends towards reduction of capital income taxation in enacted by law tax rates. But also, 
we have seen that there are justifications for taxation of capital. Weak separability is the first reason 
that is bad when it comes to choose between present and future consumption. Though there is a 
lack of empirical proofs of this statement. The second reason being that if agents receive inheritance 
that is not taxed by the tax on bequest, then it may be optimal to tax the capital income. Though 
taxation of bequests (from which consumer derives utility until his death) by the Hicks-Leontief 
theorem   Then another justification for capital taxation in the economy is the sub-optimality of the 
capital accumulation in the economy. In such a case when economies suffer from too little capital 
and when agents have a Cobb-Douglas utility function it will be useful to tax the capital and to 
transfer the revenue to the young population. Also, the last result can be achieved by imposing 
lump-sum tax to the old and subsiding the capital. So there is no a strong argument that support 
taxing capital same as income. But as in Stiglitz (1985) ,model of capital taxation were a skill 
premium (skill premium is defined as ratio of the wages skilled versus unskilled workers) is equal to 
the relative productivity. Ig this relative wage depends on the capital intensity (capital intensity is 
the amount of fixed capital in relation to other factors of production, especially labor i.e. capital to 
efficient labor ratio), and there is a good proof in the empirical literature that confirm that unskilled 
labor is a good substitutable to capital than skilled labor. Increase in a capital intensity increases 
relative wage of skilled versus unskilled labor, so that productivity as a function of capital is a 
decreasing function. Results from the paper also provide rationale for distortions (upward and 
downward) in the savings behavior in a simple two period model where high-skilled and low-skilled 
have different non-observable time preferences beyond their earning capacity. In the comparisons 
between benchmark(one with labor tax and consumption tax)  and reform economy (no income tax 
and no capital tax only consumption tax) : benchmark capital stock is lower in the benchmark 
economy, benchmark labor is the same (is not affected by the taxation), Reform output is higher 
than the benchmark output, aggregate benchmark consumption is lower than the reform economy 
consumption, initial guess for value function is higher in the reform economy ,in the reform 
economy consumption tax benchmark value is higher than the benchmark economy. In the model of 
dynamic taxation: Ramsey taxation model, as it can be spotted from the results there is not much 
difference from the different consumption tax rate. These results prove that consumption tax is 
more optimal for the economy than income or capital tax. Though these results cannot be 
generalized for the actual economies. That is to say, confirmation of Diamond and Mirrlees 
(1971b),result, that tax system can be designed to minimize distortions and disincentives, and to 
eliminate production inefficiencies. Actually, this paper opened topic of research on tax mechanism 
design and minimization of tax incidence (tax burden), Arrow, K. et al. (2001). These results 
furthermore can be empirically tested in some well-defined models.  
 
 
 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3390397 
22 
 
References  
 
 
1. Aiyagari, S. R. (1994): “Uninsured Idiosyncratic Risk and Aggregate Saving,” Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 109(3), 659–684 
2. Aiyagari, S. R. (1995): “Optimal Capital Income Taxation with Incomplete Markets,Borrowing 
Constraints, and Constant Discounting,” Journal of Political Economy, 103(6),1158–75. 
3. Akerlof, G. (1978)“The Economics of Tagging as Applied to the Optimal Income Tax,Welfare 
Programs, and Manpower Planning”, American Economic Review, Vol. 68, 1978, 8-19. (web) 
4. Arrow, K. (1953), “The Role of Securities in the Optimal Allocation of Risk Bearing”, Review of 
Economic Studies, 1964, 31, 91-96. 
5. Arrow, K. J., Bernheim, B. D., Feldstein,M.S., McFadden,D.,L., Poterba,J.M., Solow,R.,M., 
(2011). "100 Years of the American Economic Review: The Top 20 Articles." American 
Economic Review, 101 (1): 1-8.  DOI: 10.1257/aer.101.1.1 
6. Atkinson, A.B. and  Stiglitz,J. (1976)“The design of tax structure: Direct versus indirect 
taxation”,Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 6, 1976, 55-75. (web) 
7. Atkinson, A.B. and A. Sandmo (1980) “Welfare Implications of the Taxation of Savings”, 
Economic Journal, Vol. 90, 1980, 529-49. (web) 
8. Atkinson, A.B. and Stiglitz,J. (1980)”Lectures on Public Economics”, Chap 14-4 New York: 
McGraw Hill, 1980. (web) 
9. Auerbach, A. (2009). “The choice between income and consumption taxes: A primer”. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
10. Auerbach, A., Kotlikoff,L. (1987a).“Evaluating Fiscal Policy with a Dynamic Simulation 
Model”,American Economic Review, May 1987, 49?55 
11. Auerbach,A.,J.,Kotlikoff,L.J.,(1987b), “Dynamic fiscal policy”, Cambridge University Press 
12. Barro,R.,J.(1979),”On the determination of public debt”, Journal of political economy ,  87:940 
971 
13. Brewer, M., E. Saez, and A. Shephard (2010)“Means Testing and Tax Rates on Earnings”,in 
The Mirrlees Review: Reforming the Tax System for the 21st Century, Oxford,University 
Press, 2010. (web) 
14. Chamley, C. (1986). "Optimal Taxation of Capital Income in General Equilibrium with Infinite 
Lives". Econometrica. 54 (3): 607–622. doi:10.2307/1911310. 
15. Chari, V.V. ,Kehoe, P.J., (1999).” Optimal fiscal and monetary policy”. Handbook of 
macroeconomics, 1, pp.1671-1745. 
16. Cooley, T. (1995), “Frontiers of Business Cycle Research”, Princeton University Press,Princeton 
NJ. 
17. Diamond, P.(1998), “Optimal Income Taxation: An Example with a U-Shaped Pattern of 
Optimal Marginal Tax Rates”, American Economic Review, 88, 83–95. 
18. Diamond, P.,A.,Mirrlees , J.A.(1978).”A model  of social insurance with variable retirement”, 
Journal of public economics,10, pp.295-336  
19. Diamond,P.,Helms,J. and Mirrlees (1978) “Optimal taxation in a stochastic economy, A Cobb-
Douglas example”, M.I.T. Working Paper no. 217 
20. Fair,R.C. (1971),  "The Optimal Distribution of Income,"Quart. J. Econ., Nov. 1971, 85, 55779. 
21. Farhi, E., Werning, I. (2010): “Progressive Estate Taxation,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics,125 (2), 635–673. [1852,1853,1864-1866] 
22. Feldstein, M.(1978), “The Welfare Cost of Capital Income Taxation”, Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 86, No. 2, Part 2: Research in Taxation (Apr., 1978), pp. S29-S51 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3390397 
23 
 
23. Hammond, P.(2000).” Reassessing the Diamond/Mirrlees Efficiency Theorem”,Department of 
Economics, Stanford University, CA 94305-6072, U.S.A 
24. Judd, K.L. (1985) “Redistributive taxation in a simple perfect foresight model”. Journal of 
Public Economics 28, 59–83 
25. Judd, K.L. (1999) “Optimal Taxation and Spending in General Competitive Growth 
Models”Journal of Public Economics 71: 1–26 
26. Kaplow, L. (1994). “Taxation and risk taking: A general equilibrium perspective”. National Tax 
Association 47 (4), 789–798. 
27. Kaplow, L.(2006). “On the undesirability of commodity taxation even when income taxation is 
not optimal”, Journal of Public Economics, Vol.90, 2006, 1235-1260. (web) 
28. Kotlikoff, L. ,Summers,L. (1981). “The Role of Intergenerational Transfers in Aggregate Capital 
Accumulation”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 89, 1981, 706-732.  
29. Kreps, David M.(1988),” Notes on the Theory of Choice”. Westview Press ,chapters 2 and 5. 
30. Laroque, G.(2005).“Indirect Taxation is Superfluous under Separability and Taste 
Homogeneity: A Simple Proof”, Economic Letters, Vol. 87, 2005, 141-144. 
31. Lee,D., Saez,E. (2012). ”Optimal minimum wage policy in competitive labor markets,” Journal 
of Public Economics, vol 96(9-10), pages 739-749. 
32. Mankiw NG, Weinzierl M, Yagan D.(2009),” Optimal Taxation in Theory and Practice”. Journal 
of Economic Perspectives. 2009;23 (4) :147-174. 
33. Mirrlees, J. A. (1971). "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation". The Review 
of Economic Studies. 38 (2): 175–208. doi:10.2307/2296779. JSTOR 2296779 
34. Mirrlees, J.A. (1982), “Migration and Optimal Income Taxes”, Journal of Public Economics,Vol. 
18, 1982, 319-341. (web) 
35. Mirrlees, J.A., (1976). “Optimal tax theory: a synthesis”. Journal of Public Economics 6, 327–
358. 
36. Mirrlees,J.A., Diamond,P.(1971b). "Optimal Taxation and Public Production II: Production 
Efficiency". American Economic Review. 61: 261-278. 
37. Mirrlees,J.A.,(1986), “The theory of optimal taxation”, Chapter 24 Handbook of Mathematical 
Economics, edited by K. J. Arrow and M. Intriligator, eds. (Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1986) 
38. Mirrlees,J.A.,Diamond,P.(1971a). "Optimal Taxation and Public Production I: Production 
Efficiency". American Economic Review. 61: 8–27. 
39. Modigliani, F. (1966). "The Life Cycle Hypothesis of Saving, the Demand for Wealth and the 
Supply of Capital". Social Research. 33 (2): 160–217. JSTOR 40969831. 
40. Modigliani, F. (1976).“Life-cycle, individual thrift, and the wealth of nations,” American 
Economic Review, 76(3), 297–313. 
41. Modigliani, F. (1986). “Life cycle, individual thrift and the wealth of nations”. American 
Economic Review 76 (3), 297–313 
42. Modigliani, F. (1988).“The Role of Intergenerational Transfers and Lifecyle Savings in the 
Accumulation of Wealth”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 2, 1988, 15-40.  
43. Modigliani,F.,Brumberg,R.H.(1954), “Utility analysis and the consumption function: an 
interpretation of cross-section data,” in Kenneth K. Kurihara, ed., PostKeynesian Economics, 
New Brunswick, NJ. Rutgers University Press. Pp 388–436. 
44. Ordover, J.,  Phelps,E. (1979). “The concept of optimal taxation in the overlapping generations 
model of capital and wealth”. Journal of Public Economics 12: 1–26. 
45. Piketty, T. , Saez,E., (2013) “A Theory of Optimal Inheritance Taxation”, Econometrica, 81(5), 
2013, 1851-1886. 
46. Piketty, Т., Postel-Vinay,G.,Rosenthal,J.L,(2014). “Inherited vs. Self-Made Wealth: Theory and 
Evidence from a Rentier Society (1872-1927),” Explorations in Economic History 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3390397 
24 
 
47. Piketty,T., Saez,E., Stantcheva,S.( 2014). "Optimal Taxation of Top Labor Incomes: A Tale of 
Three Elasticities," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic 
Association, vol. 6(1), pages 230-71 
48. Ramsey, F. (1927). "A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation". Economic Journal. 37: 47 61. 
doi:10.2307/2222721. 
49. Roy, R.(1947). "La Distribution du Revenu Entre Les Divers Biens". Econometrica. 15 (3): 205–
225. JSTOR 1905479. 
50. Sadka,E.(1976),” On Income Distribution, Incentive Effects and Optimal Income 
Taxation”,The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 43, No. 2, (Jun., 1976), pp. 261-267 
51. Saez, E. (2001). "Using Elasticities to Derive Optimal Income Tax Rates". Review of Economic 
Studies. 68: 105–229. doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00166. 
52. Saez, E. ,S. Stantcheva (2016a). “A Simpler Theory of Optimal Capital Taxation”, NBER Working 
Paper 22664, 2016. 
53. Saez, E. ,S. Stantcheva (2016b). “Generalized social marginal welfare weights for optimal tax 
theory”. The American Economic Review, 106(1), pp.24-45. 
54. Saez, E., (2002). “The desirability of commodity taxation under non-linear income taxation and 
heterogeneous tastes”. Journal of Public Economics, 83(2), pp.217- 230. 
55. Saez,E.(2001).”Using elasticities to derive optimal income tax rates”, The Review of Economic 
Studies, 68(1), pp.205- 229. 
56. Salanie,B.(2003).”The Economic of Taxation”. The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts 
London, England 
57. Seade, J. K., (1977), “On the shape of optimal tax schedules”, Journal of Public Economics, 7, 
issue 2, p. 203-235. 
58. Stiglitz, J. (1985). “Inequality and capital taxation”. IMSSS Technical Report 457, Stanford 
University. 
59. Stiglitz, J.(1982) “Self-Selection and Pareto Efficient Taxation,” Journal of Public Economics, 
1982,17, 213–240. 
60. Stokey, N., Lucar,R.. and Prescott ,E.(1989). Recursive Methods in Economic Dynamics. 
Harvard University Press. ISBN 0-674-75096-9. 
61. Teodorescu,S.(2010), “On the truncated composite lognormal-Pareto model”, MATH. 
REPORTS 12(62), 1 (2010), 71–84 
62. Tresch, R. W. (2008). “Public Sector Economics”. 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010: 
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. p. 67. ISBN 978-0-230-52223-7. 
63. Tuomala, M.(1990). “Optimal Income Tax and Redistribution”. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
64. Varian,H.R.(1980).”Redistributive taxation as social insurance”. Journal of public 
Economics,14(1), pp.49-68. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3390397 
